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1THE FINAL BALANCE SHEET? THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S 
CHALLENGES AND CONCESSIONS TO THE WESTPHALIAN MODEL
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto*
[…. The approval of this Court [International Criminal Court] was indeed ‘a turn in the road 
of history.’ By ceding the authority to define and punish crimes, many nations took an 
irrevocable step to the loss of national sovereignty and the reality of global government. I, for 
one, am heartened to see that the United States took the right turn on the road of history, and 
I will work hard to ensure there is no backtracking.]1
I. Introduction
French political thinker Jean Bodin offered the first systematic approach to the theory of 
sovereignty in his work, Les Six Livres De La Republique2 in 1576. He defined sovereignty as 
the ‘State’s supreme authority over citizens and subjects.’3 Half a century later in 1625, Hugo 
Grotius in his seminal work De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libris Tres,4 maintained that the laws 
governing relations among nations must first safeguard the sovereignty of States themselves 
holding that rules preventing interference in another State’s jurisdiction would help safeguard 
this sovereignty. According to Grotius, other principles of international law5 would emerge as 
a consequence of the lasting arrangements that sovereign States make among themselves.6
Essentially, sovereignty began as a domestic term in a domestic context. It referred to 
relations between rulers and those they ruled, between the ‘sovereign’ and his or her subjects. 
As the term entered the parlance of international law, States continued to emphasise the 
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2domestic implications of the concept and worked to establish each others’ right to exclusive 
jurisdiction and control over their own territory. 
Following the Thirty Years’ War, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia attempted to codify an 
international system based on the coexistence of a plurality of States exercising unimpeded 
sovereignty within their territories thus enshrining untrammelled State sovereignty and 
freedom from outside interference as the foundation of modern international law. After three 
decades of war between Catholics and Protestants, the Peace of Westphalia sought to separate 
the powers of church and State.  In so doing, it transferred to Nation-States the special godlike 
features of church authority.  States inherited sovereignty, and with it an unassailable position 
above the law that has since remained the central element of international relations. 
Sovereignty is a notion which, perhaps more than any other, has come to dominate our 
understanding of national and international life.  Its history parallels the evolution of the 
modern State. Much of the confusion surrounding the concept arises from the many 
connotations it has acquired over the centuries, in particular from its association with notions 
of, national interest, national independence and national security, but also with the notion of 
strength understood as the State’s capacity to impose its will whether on its own citizens or 
other States. Like private ownership, sovereignty implies absolute rights to territory and the 
prohibition of trespass by others. The enclosure of territory by sovereign boundaries separates 
internal from external space.  
To be sovereign is to be subject to no higher power. For more than three centuries, 
international relations have been structured around the legal fiction that States have exclusive 
(sovereign) jurisdiction over their territory and its occupants and resources.  Most of the 
fundamental norms, rules, and practices of international relations rest on the premise of State 
Even many characteristic violations of sovereignty are themselves rooted in State sovereignty, 
3that is, in the absence of political power or legal authority above States. There has always 
been tension, however, between State sovereignty and other values that call into question its 
primacy. Sovereignty is a legal fiction that continues to evolve. It is not an immutable feature 
of the human condition. In fact, the Permanent Court of International justice pointed out in 
1923 that ‘the question of whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of 
a State is an essentially relative question; it depends on the development of international 
relations’. 
Although hardcore realists still cling to the notion that States are supreme, reality points to the 
fact that international law norms have developed rules whose aim is to modulate the behavior 
of States. This implies violation of or intrusion upon local authority. International penal 
process has significantly contributed to the threatening of the overall concept of sovereignty. 
The significance of international penal process and its accompanying tenet of international 
justice reflects an evolution in the perception of sovereignty heralding a qualitative shift 
which necessitates an ethical vision in which human values supersede State rights. This 
Article is premised on the contention that international penal institutions have contributed to a 
diminution of the State’s supremacy by acknowledging that though States remain the 
principal actors on the international scene, there is limitation on their internal power and 
authority manifest in the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) goal of attempting to influence 
the behavior of individuals at all levels of authority and power through enforcement of 
international criminal and humanitarian law. This entails an ‘interfering’ in political processes 
to alter outcomes by placing restrictions on the State’s freedom of action and exercise of its 
sovereign power.
Although the State has expanded its capabilities for control and involvement in some areas, 
overall the trend in international criminal and humanitarian law has been toward the 
4‘diminution of State authority’ with authority being relocated both upward to international 
penal institutions and downward as individuals and groups assert themselves as subjects of 
international law. The institutionalisation of international penal process represents a shift in 
authority from States to the international community. International penal process when put in 
opposition to the State, is the enemy of State power. The notion of international justice now 
points towards a sphere that though controlled by States, is ineffaceably external to power. 
Given the far-reaching transformation of the social and political landscape we have witnessed 
in the last century, there has been a transformation of the concept and practice of sovereignty 
through the development of international penal process.
The International Criminal Court was the last great international institution of the 20th
Century. In the words of Sadat and Carden:
It is no exaggeration to suggest that its creation has the potential to reshape our thinking about 
international law. For if many aspects of the Rome Statute demonstrate the tenacity of traditional 
Westphalian notions of State sovereignty, there are nonetheless elements of supranationalism and 
efficacy (in spite of the complementarity principle) in the Statute that could prove extremely powerful. 
Not only does the Statute place State and non-State actors side-by-side in the international arena, but 
the Court will put real people in real jails. Indeed, the establishment of the Court raises hopes that the 
lines between international law on the one hand, and world order, on the other, are blurring and that 
the normative structure being created by international law might influence or even restrain the 
Hobbesian order established by the politics of States.7
This Article examines the organization and operating principles of the Court. Many aspects of 
the Rome Statute8 challenge fundamental tenets of the structure of international law existing 
heretofore. No analysis could address all the aspects of this new international institution and 
the Article seeks to focus attention on some of its major features impacting on State 
sovereignty--the focus of this Article. Part II of the Article explores the structure and 
competence of the Court and in particular the powers of the prosecutor, general principles 
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5underlying the jurisdiction of the Court, the formulation of the complementarity principle in 
the Court’s Statute, the manner in which cases will come to the Court and be decided and the 
State cooperation regime. It examines the State cooperation regime governing the conduct of 
investigations and prosecutions on State territory and the arrest of suspects and their surrender 
to the Court noting that the Court’s enforcement jurisdiction is paltry, at best, suggesting the 
unease of States to the idea of a permanent international penal process. Part III, is a general 
reflection on the merits and demerit of the International Criminal Court.
II. Structure and Competence of the International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute envisages that the Court will have four organs: the Presidency, the 
Judiciary (which is composed of three divisions: Appeals, Trial, and Pre-Trial Divisions), the 
Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry.9 The Statute provides that the judges are all to be 
elected as full-time members of the Court,10 and that the Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutors,11and 
Registrar12 shall also serve on a full-time basis. This was a major improvement over earlier 
proposals for the ICC, virtually all of which conceived of the Court as a ‘stand by’ 
institution,13 whose personnel would largely be part-time.14 The Statute also expressly 
addresses the need for continuing oversight by the States Parties by establishing an Assembly 
of States Parties and providing rules for its organization and operation.
Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998. The final vote recorded was 120 in favour, 
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62.1. The Office of the Prosecutor: A Watershed for States Trust and Distrust of the 
       International Penal Process
Under the 1994 ILC Draft Statute for an international criminal court, only States and the 
Security Council could lodge complaints with the Court.15 The Rome Statute in addition also 
permits the Prosecutor to bring cases before the Court on his or her own initiative.16 Defining 
the powers of the Prosecutor was a highly contentious issue during the PrepCom I meetings, 
specifically with respect to whether the Prosecutor should be able to act proprio motu or ex 
officio, that is, on his or her own motion, in bringing cases to the Court. This issue created a 
deep schism among the PrepCom I delegates, with many smaller nations, some European 
nations, and the NGOs strongly supporting a Prosecutor able to act independently of State 
referral,17 and many larger countries, including most of the permanent five members of the 
Security Council, opposing an independent Prosecutor.18 Many States were concerned that the 
independent Prosecutor could become an ‘independent counsel for the universe,’ 
unaccountable to anyone and liable to file complaints against States on the basis of political 
prejudices rather than legal concerns.19 However, numerous procedural safeguards are built 
into the Statute to prevent the Prosecutor from abusing his or her power.
15
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the Rome Statute provides that the prosecutor of the court ‘may initiate investigations proprio 
motu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.’21 Thus, the 
ICC prosecutor may, on his/her own initiative, launch investigations and indict individuals for 
crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. The prosecutor may investigate alleged crimes based on 
the referral of the UN Security Council, State Parties, victims, NGOs, or any other reliable 
source.22 The prosecutor determines the reliability of the source, as ‘he or she deems 
appropriate.’23 Some groups tout the ability to obtain referrals from non-State sources (NGOs, 
victims, etc.) as a most important victory because they feared States would be unwilling to 
refer situations to the court.24 This is especially so based on the experience of State-based 
complaints procedures in the human rights field. States rarely bring referrals and it is doubtful 
whether the ICC will enjoy any greater cooperation and diligence on the part of States in 
triggering court action. 
With the authority to initiate investigations on his/her own, the ICC prosecutor has potential 
to become an effective inquisitor with the authority to use his/her office in different States and 
regions of the world wherever any matters of concern to the court arise without being unduly 
shackled by national sovereignty concerns in matters that warrant his/her attention. Though 
the Pre-Trial Chamber of the court has the power to deny the furtherance of an investigation 
by the prosecutor,25 the prosecutor has the power to investigate situations with no oversight 
Says Independent Counsel Statute Should Go’, Agence France-Presse, 3 March 1999, available in 1999 WL 
2556408.
20
 Senate Hearing, above note 1, testimony of Ambassador David J Scheffer (acknowledging the powers and 
limitations of the office of prosecutor). Prosecutors with any semblance of independence are currently 
disfavoured in the United States.
21 Rome Statute, above note 8, art 15.
22
 Ibid.
23
 Ibid.
24
 See Human Rights Watch, ‘Summary of the Key Provisions of the ICC Statute’. Available at 
<http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/icc-statute.htm> (visited 15 January 2000) .
25 Rome Statute, above note 8.
8before he/she must submit it to the Pre-Trial Chamber.26 In addition, he/she may return with a 
new request based on new evidence regarding the same situation.27 Therefore, a persistent 
prosecutor, backed by groups or individuals, may pursue a particular individual or group 
he/she believes responsible for a crime until the Pre-Trial Chamber allows the investigation to 
proceed towards court action. The United States and several other nations felt this power was 
too broad. This is a critical reason for the United States declining to ratify the Statute. 
One of the greatest concerns expressed by non-signing States is the prosecutor’s power to 
initiate an investigation without supervision of any kind. There is no requirement that the 
prosecutor act on the request of a sovereign State or at the direction of an international 
organization such as the United Nations Security Council. The prosecutor is completely 
independent, without any accountability (other than to the ICC).28 Nothing in the Statute it is 
argued, appears to limit this power. Proponents of the court claim that the power of the 
prosecutor is not as broad or unlimited as the Court’s opponents make it out to be. The 
limitations they point to arise in Article 53 of the Statute and consist mainly of a set of factors 
the prosecutor should consider before pursuing an investigation. Article 53 states:
The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or her, initiate an 
investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this 
statute. In determining whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether:
(a) The information available . . . provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed;
(b) The case is . . . admissible under Article 17; and
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interest of the victims, there are nonetheless 
substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.29
26
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9Opponents of the Court argue that these discretionary considerations amount to limitations 
addressing only whether a crime has been committed, whether jurisdiction exists, 
admissibility of evidence, and other potential overriding political concerns. These reservations 
are minimal. The Statute contains qualifications that allow the prosecutor to have great 
leeway in initiating investigations. For example, ‘reasonable basis’ is a low bar to 
investigation. Therefore, the discretion of the prosecutor is quite broad, extending to all 
aspects of evidence gathering, taking of oral and written testimony, and so forth.30
2.2. Scope of the Court’s Jurisdiction
2.2.1. Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae
The ILC Draft Statute originally conceived of four separate jurisdictional hurdles that would 
be prerequisites to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction in any particular case: First, none of 
the crimes except genocide were within the Court’s ‘inherent’ jurisdiction (competence 
propre), but instead were subject to a complex regime of State consent that was bypassed only 
in cases referred to the Court by the Security Council; 31 Second, States could (again, except 
in the case of a Security Council referral) limit the jurisdiction of the Court accepted by them 
in advance by lodging a declaration to that effect with the depositary;32 Third, the Security 
Council had to make a determination of aggression for a complaint on that basis to be 
receivable by the Court. Fourth, assuming subject matter jurisdiction (competence) to be 
generally present, all cases had to be ‘admissible’ in keeping with the principle of 
complementarity on which the Statute of the Court was predicated.33
29 Rome Statute, above note 8. The remainder of art 53 spells out the Prosecutor’s duties if he or she chooses not 
to continue the investigation, and the Pre-Trial Council’s power of review of such a decision.
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The Rome Statute extends the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to four crimes:34 genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.35 In rejecting a ‘Court a la carte’, the Statute 
now requires all States Parties to accept the Court’s inherent jurisdiction over all crimes in 
Article 5, and no longer permits reservations with respect to the Court’s jurisdiction over 
particular offences.36 It also reduces, but in no way eliminates, the power of the Security 
Council over ongoing proceedings by permitting the Council to interfere only if it adopts a 
resolution under Chapter VII requesting the Court not to commence an investigation or 
prosecution, or to defer any proceeding already in progress.37
Despite the Rome Statute’s extension of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction over four core 
crimes, the subject matter of the Court is narrower than Article 20 of the original ILC Draft 
Statute, which envisaged that the Court would also be able to hear cases involving treaty 
crimes.38 Restricting subject matter jurisdiction in this way was largely positive, for it 
permitted the Diplomatic Conference to strengthen the compulsory nature of the Court’s 
jurisdiction, which, as originally conceived by the International Law Commission, was largely
optional.39 Because the Preparatory Committee also felt strongly that the Court’s Statute 
should define the crimes within its jurisdiction, rather than simply list them, as the ILC had 
34 Rome Statute, above note 8, art 5.
35
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done, inclusion of some of the treaty crimes was problematic given difficulties in reaching a 
consensus on their definition.40
Frighteningly, to apprehensive States, many advocates of the ICC desire to expand the court’s 
jurisdiction beyond the core offences of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
aggression.41 The Final Act adopted by the delegates to the Rome Conference recommends an 
additional conference to ‘consider the crimes of terrorism and drug crimes with a view to 
arriving at an acceptable definition and their inclusion in the list of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.’42 The amendment procedures under Article 121 of the Statute 
would allow a wide range of transnational crimes currently the preserve of State-centric 
mechanisms to be added to the court’s jurisdiction.43 This possible expansion of the court’s 
jurisdiction is viewed by its opponents as extremely dangerous as it ‘would infringe upon a 
nation’s sovereignty and ability to try crimes that affect domestic policy in their home
setting.’44 Though transnational crimes (terrorism, hostage-taking, drug-trafficking etc) 
present serious problems for the international community, some States feel particularly 
strongly about their inclusion in the Rome Statute considering that though proscribed under 
international law, domestic justice systems remain the primary avenue for prosecuting 
offenders.
40
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2.2.2. Jurisdiction Ratione Loci
The geographic scope of the Court’s jurisdiction, ratione loci, varies depending on the 
mechanism by which the case comes to the Court. In the event that the Security Council refers 
the matter, jurisdiction covers the territory of every State in the world, whether or not the 
State in question is a party to the Statute.45 If the matter is referred by a State Party or initiated 
proprio motu by the Prosecutor, however, the Court’s jurisdiction is more restricted but still 
extensive. In such instances, jurisdiction extends to the territory of a non-State Party only if 
that State consents to the jurisdiction of the Court, irrespective of whether the acts were 
committed in the territory of the consenting State or the accused is a national of the 
consenting State.46 The fact that this regime additionally gives the ICC jurisdiction over the 
citizens of non-States Parties, allowing the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction in certain 
circumstances within the territory of non-State Parties47 is considered by some States to be in 
direct contravention of standing international law which binds States only to those 
international agreements to which they consent.48
In cases involving a Security Council referral, the Statute’s scope is unbounded by geography. 
Thus, even though Article 10 attempts to separate the Statute from customary international 
law existing outside the Statute’s application, and each definition of crimes purports to define 
the law only ‘for purposes of this Statute,’49 the Statute, as all have admitted, and to which the 
United States has in fact strenuously objected, applies to non-State Party nationals in certain 
circumstances, and can be applied by the Security Council to all the human beings of the 
45
 See Rome Statute, above note 8, art 13(b). Because the Security Council will refer cases only under its Chapter 
VII powers, referral to the Court, like the establishment of the two ad hoc tribunals, is presumably a measure 
‘not involving the use of force’ that the Security Council may adopt to maintain international peace and security. 
See Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, paras 34-36 (Appeals Chamber Oct. 2, 1995) .
46 Rome Statute, above note 8, arts 4(2), 12(2).
47
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world. It should be noted though that this power of the Council already inheres to the Council 
independent of the ICC and any attempt to limit this power would have been inconsistent with 
the UN Charter. 
Opponents of the ICC argue that the greatest danger of the ICC lies in its broad jurisdiction 
and the possible expansion and abuse of that jurisdiction. They point to the fact that the ICC 
can exercise jurisdiction over any national of any State-Party even when in the territory of a 
non-State Party, as well as over any individuals, regardless of nationality, within the territory 
of a State Party.50 This was yet another of the reasons put forward by the United States 
delegation to the Rome Conference for initial refusal to sign the Statute since in its final form, 
the Statute extended the court’s jurisdiction to cover nationals of States not party to the 
Statute.51 This amounted to an indirect grant of jurisdiction over any person involved in the 
State where the crimes occurred, regardless of whether their nation was subject to the ICC. 
The United States delegation sought to amend this provision, but was overwhelmingly 
defeated. Therefore, the Statute signed in Rome may violate national sovereignty by indirectly 
allowing jurisdiction over the nationals of States that choose not to become State Parties. A 
logical ramification of this, the United States argued is that States will be less inclined to send 
troops to participate in peacekeeping missions, therefore, diminishing security in some parts 
of the world. Primarily for this reason, although the Clinton administration favoured the ICC, 
the United States delegation refused to sign the Statute at Rome52
Overall though, with regard to the court’s jurisdiction ratione loci, there is unease with the 
nature of the law being made. Legal theory and political reality conceive of international law-
50
 Ibid art 12. 
51 Rome Statute, ibid; Senate Hearing, above note 1 at 12 (testimony of Ambassador David J Scheffer).
52
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making as predominantly contractual and consensual. Yet, while the Rome Statute takes the 
form of a contract between States, the law is clearly intended to have the status of custom and 
even of jus cogens obligations. For objecting States, there seems to them to be a 
schizophrenia about the status and binding effect of the prescriptive norms that the text 
attempts to redress by, in certain limited cases, deferring to the sovereignty of States but 
significantly in other aspects disregarding sovereignty.
2.2.3. Jurisdiction Ratione Personae
Firstly, the Statute provides for jurisdiction ratione personae over natural persons only 
(thereby excluding organizations or States).53 The ILC, in early discussions on the question of 
an international criminal court, proposed adding State culpability.54 The proposal was rejected 
as ‘science fiction.’55 Secondly, unlike the ILC Draft, which was silent on the age of criminal 
responsibility, the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to persons over eighteen years of age.56 The 
Rome Statute establishes personal jurisdiction over the individuals in the Member States.57
Necessarily, personal jurisdiction by an international organisation raises sovereignty issues 
(though not for the first time as this is manifest from the experience of the post-World War II 
international military tribunals as well as the ad hoc international criminal tribunals of the 
1990s). Many proponents of the ICC minimise the potential intrusions on sovereignty that 
may occur. ‘Sovereignty concerns will have to be addressed; but . . . international law is 
gradually moving away from a State-centrist approach towards a more moral, human rights 
approach. It is imperative that this reality be recognised in the jurisdiction and the powers of 
53
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the court.’58  This move away from a state-centred approach is certainly consistent with the 
trend towards declining State sovereignty. 
A crucial test for the ICC will take place over sovereignty. The individual, not the State, will 
be subject to the jurisdiction of the court. It has been suggested that States may ‘run the risk 
of having their nationals sent to be tried by judges possibly from enemy or rogue nations.’59
The United States thought it unlikely that any State will cede to the court’s jurisdiction over 
their citizens, except when it suited their political goals.60 Therefore, the ICC would find 
cooperation only when a State deemed it expedient. Even some who espouse the concept of 
an ICC acknowledge the problem that sovereignty presents:
States are understandably jealous of their right to investigate and try international criminals in their 
own courts. National pride leads States to have faith in the competency and fairness of their domestic 
judicial systems. They do not want to surrender control over criminal cases to another tribunal. 
Certainly, with the exception of the core crimes, States are capable of prosecuting the majority of 
international crimes fairly and effectively, and the Statute [for the International Criminal Court] 
should encourage national prosecutions when feasible. Moreover, victimized States have incentives to 
pursue cases that an international tribunal might lack.61
The United States delegation attempted to resolve this at the Rome Conference by preserving 
the right of reservation to specific aspects of the Statute. This proposal was soundly defeated 
by the rest of the delegates. While there may remain the option of amending the Statute, some 
groups are adamantly opposed to such a thought. The fear that amendments to the ICC, 
58
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particularly by powerful nations, would only make it a tool of the UN Security Council62 is 
counterbalanced by the reality that it is unlikely that those States which have demonstrated 
their support for the concept of the ICC by ratifying the Statute will subsequently vote to 
amend the Statute by limiting the court’s jurisdiction. 
Within the context of its jurisdiction rationae personae, it should be noted that the Rome 
Statute may affect criminal procedure in Third States. A notable example is double jeopardy 
in domestic criminal proceedings. Article 20 of the Rome Statute imposes a double jeopardy 
limitation on national jurisdictions. As Professor Gennady Danilenko observes,
[u]nder Article 20, no person who has been convicted or acquitted by the ICC for the relevant crimes 
can be tried again before ‘another court’ even if they happen to be crimes under domestic laws. The 
phrase ‘another court’ includes both international and domestic courts. As a result, subsequent 
proceedings in domestic courts of State Parties are barred by a final order issued by the ICC. It is not 
entirely clear whether a domestic trial after a final ICC order by a Third State would be consistent 
with the general principle non bis in idem. Many States are bound by this principle as a matter of 
treaty law… Although the practice of the Human Rights Committee indicates that non bis in idem has 
only domestic application, a question may be raised as to whether it can now be reinterpreted as 
having international dimensions as well.
2.3. Foundations of the Court’s Jurisdiction
One intriguing aspect of the Rome Statute which underscores its nature as a constitutive 
document is that it combines jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate, and to enforce all in one 
instrument. It is perhaps the implementation and implications of the jurisdictional theories of 
the Statute that are its most revolutionary features.63 For, through a rather extraordinary 
process, these three jurisdictional categories classically known to international law have been 
transformed from norms providing ‘which State can exercise authority over whom, and in 
what circumstances,’ 64 to norms that establish under what conditions the international 
community, or more precisely the States Parties to the Statute, may prescribe international 
62
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rules of conduct, may adjudicate breaches of those rules, and may enforce those adjudications. 
But even this effort to overcome one of the major historical objections to an ICC drew fire 
from then United States Senator, John Ashcroft who argued that: ‘If there is one critical 
component of sovereignty, it is the authority to define crimes and punishment. This court 
strikes at the heart of sovereignty by taking this fundamental power away from individual 
countries and giving it to international bureaucrats.’65 Senator Ashcroft, expressing the 
sovereignty concerns he felt for the United States, continued, ‘No aspect of the Court is more 
troubling, however, than the fact that it has been framed without apparent respect for--and 
indeed in direct contravention of--the United States Constitution …The proposed court . . . 
neither reflects nor guarantees the protections of the Bill of Rights. The administration was 
right to reject the Court and must remain steadfast in its refusal to join a court that stands as a 
rejection of America’s constitutional values.’66
Arguably a cession of sovereignty that abrogates the fundamental principles of any country, 
whether that sovereignty be the ability to define crime and punishment or the establishment of 
constitutional principles, is a cession that cuts too deep.67 For present purposes, it suffices to 
say that the power and legitimacy of these norms was premised on the well-accepted theory of 
universal jurisdiction that derives from the idea that when criminal activity rises to a certain 
level of harm (the gravity idea threaded through the Statute), or sufficiently important 
interests of international society are threatened, all States may apply their laws to the act, 
65
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‘even if it occurred outside its territory, even if it has been perpetrated by a non-national, and 
even if its nationals have not been harmed by [it].’68
The Statute does not propose criteria for sorting the international from the national; That is 
because the Statute does not focus on this issue at all, leaving it essentially up to the 
complementarity principle and State consent regime to sort permissible from impermissible 
assertions of the Court’s jurisdiction (to adjudicate). The one explicit clue is the Statute’s 
command that the Court is to exercise its jurisdiction only in cases involving ‘the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.’69 This phrase combines both a 
substantive limit on the Court’s jurisdiction with its underlying premise--that in a world of 
conflicting ‘sovereigns,’ both territorial (States) and non-territorial (the international 
community as a whole), some system must be adopted to sort permissible from impermissible 
assertions of jurisdiction (to prescribe).70 As will be shown below, the complementarity 
principle and State consent regime will generally restrain the exercise of the Court’s 
prescriptive jurisdiction such that the Court’s reach does not exceed what reasonable theories 
of power distribution and lawmaking authority between ‘sovereigns’ suggest the proper 
sphere of the Court’s authority should be.71
2.3.1. Complementarity with State Judicial Systems: A Step Back or a Step Forward?
The Rome Statute reflects the practical experience of the international community in the 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals in several important ways, and no doubt represents an 
improvement over its predecessors. Yet in one respect the ICC will do no better, and may not 
68
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69 Rome Statute, above note 8, art 5 (1); see also ibid. art 1.
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even equal, its sister institutions, for it will operate not on the basis of primacy jurisdiction, 
but subject to the principle of complementarity.72
Both the preamble to the Statute and Article 1 express a fundamental principle of the Rome 
Statute: that the Court is to be ‘complementary’ to national criminal jurisdictions.73 Although 
complementarity is not defined (and indeed, there is no general ‘definition’ section in the 
Statute, although there are definitional provisions within particular Articles),74 an analysis of 
the Articles on admissibility demonstrates that complementarity does not mean ‘concurrent’ 
jurisdiction (which it arguably could have under the ILC’s original conception). Under Article 
17, the Court may exercise jurisdiction only if: (1) national jurisdictions are ‘unwilling or 
genuinely unable’ to exercise jurisdiction; (2) the crime is of sufficient gravity; and (3) the 
person has not already been tried for the conduct on which the complaint is based.75 Article 
17 further lays out the factors to determine unwillingness as well as the elements for 
determining inability on the part of national courts:
 2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the court shall consider, having regard to 
the principles of due process recognised by international law, whether one or more of the following 
exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose 
of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court . . .;  
(b) There has been an unjustifiable delay in the proceedings . . . inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
person . . . to justice;
the ordre public of a country other than his own.’ Georges Levasseur, Les crimes contre l’humanite et le 
probleme de leur prescription, (1966) 93 Journal du Droit Internationale [J D I] 259, 267.
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(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they were 
or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring 
the person . . . to justice.76
In light of Article 17, although the stated goal of the court is to complement national court 
systems, the Statute clearly outlines processes for judicial review of national court decisions.77
Under the theory of complimentary jurisdiction, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction if a State 
shows an unwillingness or inability to genuinely prosecute crimes.78 The ICC will be able to 
assume jurisdiction over a person who has already been subjected to court proceedings in a 
domestic court if the ICC determines that the proceedings were undertaken ‘for the purpose of 
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility,’ or were otherwise not conducted 
‘independently or impartially.’79 Of course, the determination as to whether a State is 
unwilling or unable to ‘genuinely prosecute,’ or whether prior domestic court proceedings 
were independent and impartial, lies solely with the ICC itself.80 Therefore, ‘because it will 
set precedents regarding what it considers ‘effective’ and ‘ineffective’ domestic criminal 
trials, the ICC will indirectly force States to adopt those precedents or risk having cases called 
up before the international court.’81 This constitutes ‘an unprecedented change in the sources 
of national lawmaking, one that diminishes the traditional notion of State sovereignty.’82 The 
possibility that individuals are capable of appealing out of the court of last resort of their 
nation to the ICC means that the ICC will enjoy de facto judicial review. Such a review would 
result in the imposition of ICC legal theory upon the national court systems through exercise 
of its power to review whether a State’s court is unwilling or unable to prosecute individuals 
the ICC has determined fall under its jurisdiction, thus paving way for the ICC to become a 
76
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77
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part of the State legal process by reversing or upholding decisions of what were previously 
courts of last resort. 83 But this attractive avenue is unlikely to entice the court. The court will 
be well aware of the deadly political fallout that any action in this direction will cause and the 
reality of crippling the court through State withdrawals. Thus only in obvious and definite 
circumstances will the court address the merit of national court action. On a balance the court 
will be careful in avoiding matters of such political volatility. In any case, the 
complementarity provisions of the Statute enshrine a very high degree of deference to 
national proceedings offering multiple opportunities for challenge and review to safeguard the 
primacy of national courts.84 As such, complementarity provides an escape clause from 
potential constitutional difficulties, provided the State itself investigates or prosecutes.
The inclusion of complementarity as a ‘cornerstone’85 of the ICC and its substantive and 
procedural details reflect strong respect for State sovereignty interests. Although the final 
result is accurately described as a ‘delicate balance,’86 it is a balance that takes significant 
account of the concerns of those States most focused on protecting national sovereignty. 
Overall though, as with other aspects of the Rome Statute, the complementarity provisions 
reflect a willingness of States to agree to limitations in principle on State sovereignty, within 
the context of a structure that recognises and presupposes the primacy of sovereign States. In 
order to ensure that they will be able to utilise the complementarity provisions in all 
circumstances, many States are currently engaged in bringing about wide-reaching changes to 
their domestic legislation. The need for such changes depends on the state of existing national 
law. In many cases, the process of implementation of the Rome Statute has involved
enshrining the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC into the domestic legal order. This 
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allows, for example, the prosecution of crimes against humanity as such rather than as 
ordinary crimes more commonly contemplated in domestic law.87 In other cases, 
implementation has involved extending the jurisdiction of domestic courts to cover crimes 
committed outside the territory of the State.88 States that provide for this extended jurisdiction 
have the comfort of knowing that they are able to prosecute any individual appearing on their 
territory who is accused of crimes against humanity by invoking complementarity.
2.4. The International Cooperation Regime: Kowtowing to State Sovereignty
An institutional check on the ICC’s power is that it will have to work through States in 
conducting investigations, obtaining evidence, and apprehending suspects. The extent to 
which States, by becoming parties to the ICC Statute, take on obligations to assist the ICC in 
activities on their own territory is very much an issue of sovereignty. As with other areas 
defining the relationship between the ICC and States, the Rome Statute’s final text balances 
the willingness of States to make commitments necessary for the ICC to function, with a 
recognition that the ICC will operate in a world of sovereign States.89 As Fowler notes,
[t]he accommodation of sovereignty begins with the nature of the general obligation that States 
undertake by becoming parties to the ICC Statute. Proponents of a strong ICC favored a duty to 
‘comply’ with orders, rather than an obligation of ‘cooperation,’ which was deemed to be vague and 
weak. Article 86 of the ICC Statute, ‘[g]eneral obligation to cooperate,’ reflects the latter formulation, 
requiring State Parties to ‘cooperate fully with the Court.’ In an art form solution, however, specific 
86
 See Holmes, ibid at 74.
87
 The German Government, for example, has announced a comprehensive revision of the German criminal code 
to include all the crimes within the Rome Statute. See Summary of the Ratification and Implementation of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by Germany, above note 19. The Federal Cabinet adopted the 
Act of Ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Act Amending Article 16 of the 
Basic Law. They passed through the Bundestrat unanimously and, at time of writing this Article, were before 
parliamentary committees in the Bundestag, having been introduced to that Chamber on February 24, 2000. See 
Summary of the Ratification and Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by 
Germany (distributed in English by the German delegation during the June 2000 ICC Preparatory Commission 
session).
88
 For example, the implementing legislation for both Canada and New Zealand provides, to varying degrees, for 
universal jurisdiction. See Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, Statutes of Canada 2000, c.24, P 6 
(royal assent 29 June 2000); New Zealand ‘International Crimes and International Criminal Court Bill,’ 
introduced by the Hon. Phil Goff.
89
 See Phakiso Mochochoko, International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, in International Criminal Court, 
above note 4, at 305 (describing the end result as ‘a balance between the need for perfection on the one hand and 
States’ concern for certain crucial issues on the other’).
23
articles on surrender of suspects and other forms of cooperation require States to ‘comply with 
requests’ from the ICC.90
Part 9 of the Statute, entitled ‘International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance’ is one of the 
most complex sections of the Rome Statute. The 17 Articles of this Part address the 
interaction between the Court and States in the arrest and transfer of suspects to the Court, 
and in the conduct of investigations or prosecutions by the Court on State territory. Not 
surprisingly, Part 9 is the least ‘supranational’ section of the Statute. Although Article 86 
requires States Parties to ‘cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution 
of crimes,’91 the Articles that follow are so riddled with exceptions and qualifications that it is 
difficult to think of this as anything but an exhortation.92  First, the Statute essentially 
bifurcates the assistance the Court may request of States into two categories: requests for the 
arrest and surrender of persons to the Court, and requests for everything else the Court might 
need to conduct investigations and prosecutions under the Statute.93
As a matter of principle, State Parties must comply with a request from the Court for the 
arrest and surrender of a person;94 non-States Parties are under no such obligation.95 The same 
is true with respect to requests for other forms of assistance. An important issue that arises is 
constitutional prohibitions on extradition of nationals to a foreign jurisdiction that are to be 
found in many constitutions. The question is whether such prohibitions are consistent with the 
obligation of state parties to surrender suspects to the ICC. Because the ICC will not 
prosecute in absentia, the Court must gain physical control over a suspect for a trial to take 
90
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place. State Parties’ obligations to cooperate with the Court in the arrest or surrender of 
persons,96 be they nationals or not, are therefore essential to the Court’s ability to function. 
Although some exceptions may apply with respect to the duty to provide ‘other forms of 
cooperation,’ as in the case of national security in Article 93(4),97 there are no exceptions to 
the Statute’s arrest and surrender obligations. The apparent tension between constitutional 
prohibitions against extradition of nationals and ICC obligations diminishes upon a closer 
examination of the fundamental conceptual differences between ‘surrender’ to an 
international criminal court and ‘extradition’ to another state. 98 Article 102 of the Statute 
defines ‘surrender’ as ‘the delivering up of a person by a State to the Court’ and extradition as 
‘the delivering up of a person by one State to another.’99 This distinction between extradition 
and surrender is not merely semantic but substantive. Creators of constitution prohibitions 
contemplated ‘horizontal cooperation’ between national courts and not ‘vertical cooperation’ 
with an international court. As the ICC is not a ‘foreign court’ or ‘foreign jurisdiction,’ but 
rather an international one, the constitutional prohibitions against extradition may not apply.
As a purely political matter, there is no guarantee that States would be willing to surrender 
their nationals to the processes of an international criminal justice system. The Rome Statute, 
for example, establishes an obligation on States Parties to the Statute who are also parties to 
the underlying treaty proscribing the crime, to surrender the accused to the jurisdiction of the 
International Court.100 Nonetheless, without an effective mechanism for requiring the 
compliance of States with the dictates of international law, such a regime continues to rest on 
the voluntary compliance of the custodial State. Similarly, the Rome Statute requires that the 
96
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custodial State give priority to the request of the international criminal court for transfer of an 
accused over the extradition request of another state. The Statute concurrently, however, 
requires that the requesting State consent to the operation of the Court as a precondition to its 
exercise of jurisdiction.101
Although States Parties will be required to adapt their national law to ensure that they are able 
to fulfil their cooperation obligations under the Statute,102 a significant residual role remains 
for national law which will continue to control the form and procedure governing requests for 
assistance,103 as well as the execution of such requests, with very limited exceptions.104 In the 
case of conduct, the basis of that which constitutes the crime for which the Court is seeking 
surrender, the requested State is to give priority to the request from the Court unless the 
competing request represents an existing international obligation to extradite the person to the 
requesting State, in which case the requested State is to balance the ‘relevant factors’ in 
determining whether to give priority to the Court.105
With respect to other forms of cooperation in relation to investigations or prosecutions, States 
Parties remain under a general obligation of assistance to the Court.106 This assistance may 
take many forms, some of which are listed in Article 93(1), and includes the taking of 
evidence, service of documents, facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons as witnesses 
or experts before the Court, questioning persons being investigated or prosecuted by the 
Court, freezing or seizing of proceeds, property, assets, and instrumentalities of crimes, and 
101
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other such matters. Conspicuously absent is any subpoena power. That is, neither the judges 
nor the Prosecutor of the ICC (or defence counsel, presumably) appear to have any power to 
compel witnesses to appear.107
As classically conceived, jurisdiction to enforce concerns rules governing the enforcement of 
law by a State through its courts, as well as through executive, administrative, and police 
action.108  In relation to the envisaged international penal process, the most obvious point is 
that the ICC has no police force.109 Indeed, it was unthinkable to propose one either before or 
during Rome, although there was at least some precedent for doing so.110 But the orders of the 
Court, whether they be arrest warrants, judgments, orders to seize assets, or sentences, will 
need to be enforced. The delegates were not unaware of the problem and many provisions of 
the Statute address it directly.111 But virtually all of them are premised on three principles. 
First, the Court will not be permitted to sanction States directly for non-compliance with its 
orders. Rather, the Court will be required to make findings of non-compliance and direct 
those to the Assembly of States Parties and the Security Council, in the case of a Security 
Council referral to the Court. Second, the Court may not compel State compliance with its 
orders.112 That is, it may not compel the appearance of witnesses, it may not compel execution 
of arrest warrants, it may not seize bank accounts or government documents of its own 
accord. There is no subpoena power; there is no mandamus.113 Third, the personnel of the 
107
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Court will have no right, in most cases, to proceed directly to the execution of their duties on 
the territories of States, but will work through the authorities present in the requested State, 
and will be subject to national law.114 There are three important exceptions to this. First, 
pursuant to Article 56, a judge from the Court may be present ‘to observe and make 
recommendations or orders regarding the collection and preservation of evidence and the 
questioning of persons.115 Second, the Prosecutor may be authorised by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to take ‘specific investigative steps’ within the territory of a State party without the 
cooperation of the State, if the State is clearly unable to execute requests for cooperation 
because its judicial system has collapsed.116 Finally, pursuant to Article 99(4), the Prosecutor 
may under limited circumstances execute specific requests for assistance (other than arrest 
warrants)117 directly on the territory of a State Party.118
Criminal prosecution is inherently tied to notions of national sovereignty and the control over 
persons and territory which are fundamental to that notion. While international cooperation 
and judicial assistance as set out in the Rome Statute is at the very heart of the ultimate 
effectiveness of the Court by placing an affirmative obligation on States,119 this may be 
impeded by inherently national interests embedded in prohibiting and prosecuting certain 
types of conduct. In fact, some argue that the Nuremberg tribunal itself succeeded only 
because it in some ways substituted itself for the inability of the German government to try 
war criminals, the obstacle of sovereignty of the German State as a bar to the enforcement of 
justice having been destroyed by the historic events of May and June, 1945. Arguably, the 
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successful establishment of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals represents a fundamental 
departure from Nuremberg in that the authority under which they were constituted derives not 
from their status as occupied territories, but from truly international exercises of Security 
Council power. Nonetheless, both the Yugoslavia and the Rwanda tribunals were constituted 
in the midst of continuing national disarray, where the functioning national legal system had 
been subverted and compromised and could not be said to reflect basic due process 
requirements (Yugoslavia) or had collapsed altogether and did not exist (Rwanda). It is 
questionable whether a criminal justice mechanism which expects to operate alongside fully 
operational national legal systems can do so without considerable political difficulty.
III. Reflections on the ICC: Merits and Demerits of the System
3.1. The Case for the ICC
Much of the desire for a permanent solution arises from the international abhorrence of the 
atrocities committed in internal and international conflicts. This abhorrence leads to several 
policy rationales supportive of an international court. The first rationale is deterrence. Many 
people believe that if a permanent court will punish international crimes, such as genocide 
and crimes against humanity, such punishment will deter future potential criminals.120
Supporters of the ICC hold to deterrence as an important rationale.121 Some people are 
concerned that the furtherance of human rights in the world will be stymied as long as there is 
no price to be paid for violating those rights. They argue that ‘[i]mpunity not only encourages 
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the recurrence of abuses against human dignity, but also strips human rights and humanitarian 
law of their deterrent effect.’ 122
Creation of a permanent court would remove the accusation that has dogged the ad hoc 
tribunals, the fact that they are reactive and narrowly focused to solving the international 
emergency of the moment thus not wholesome institutions to contribute to universality and 
specificity in international law. While some movement has occurred in the UN to standardise 
and codify international crimes, the structure for the international court did not keep pace 
until the last decade of the 20th Century. The creation of a permanent court would be 
beneficial to the international community because it would help address what some 
internationalists see as the main failings of the international system of justice, the lack of a 
permanent and effective enforcement mechanism.123 A permanent international criminal court 
would surmount the criticism that whenever ad hoc tribunals are organised to deal with war 
crimes, it is solely to punish the vanquished. These tribunals are, therefore, open to the valid 
criticism that their purpose is just to achieve ‘victor’s justice’ and that the tribunals are in use 
only to exact retribution for the terrors of war.124 As Justice Murphy said in his dissent in Re 
Yamashita, ‘[i]f we are ever to develop an orderly international community based on a 
recognition of human dignity, it is of the utmost importance that the necessary punishment of 
those guilty of atrocities be as free as possible from the ugly stigma of revenge and 
vindictiveness.’ 125
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Another reason supporting the establishment of the ICC is the ad hoc tribunals’ lack of 
consistency and failure to establish precedent. Past ad hoc tribunals have been marked by a 
singular lack of consistency and lack of judicial memory.126 ‘From a legal standpoint, ad hoc 
tribunals cannot hope to achieve a desired level of consistency in the interpretation and 
application of international law because their statutes are inevitably tailored to meet the 
demands of the specific situation that brought them into being.’127 In this context, the ICC 
will play an important role in standardising international justice. A related concern, in 
addition to consistency, is whether the political will exists from crisis to crisis to establish a 
tribunal.128 Many people fear that judicial fatigue will set in, resulting in crimes going 
unpunished. Questions are naturally raised concerning why one conflict deserves a tribunal 
and another does not.129 For example, the UN established tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, but not for Iraq, Somalia, or Sudan. If there were a permanent ICC, the will 
required to begin an investigation into atrocities would not depend upon the politics of the UN 
or national leaders.
Finally countries rarely punish war criminals on their own. Frequently, the end of conflict 
brings a desire to return to normalcy. Additionally, conflicts often end with a negotiated 
settlement between the warring parties. Settlement often includes amnesty as a condition for 
the cessation of hostilities, freeing otherwise criminally negligent individuals from 
prosecution. New governments may also include individuals who are responsible for war 
crimes. Such countries are naturally unwilling to prosecute war criminals. Supporters of the 
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ICC claim that a permanent international institution would have the political distance 
necessary to bring these criminals, regardless of their positions, to justice. 
3.2. The Case Against the Court 
One major problem for the ICC is that so many people are accused and there are too few 
judges. In its current conception, the court will not have the capacity to operate more than a 
few trials at a time. Proponents of the court point to this issue as a reason to allow future 
growth in the size of the Court.130 However, it is difficult to imagine an international court 
large enough to handle thousands of trials in a timely fashion, such the Rwandan situation 
would require, and yet remain affordable to the world community.
The Court presumes that after an armed conflict not every country has, or will have, a legal 
system in place to perform such tasks. Physical distance will still hamper evidence gathering 
and discovery where there is no credible legal system in place to do it for the Court. Reliance 
on local legal systems is also problematic because it depends on their willingness to assist. 
Discovery is nearly always an adversarial situation. Attempting to use local law enforcement 
when it too may be resistant will defeat such efforts completely. The touted swift justice 
simply will not occur.131
The real threat to the Court’s stature is the prospect that it will be little used. If the 
international court is to command respect, it must have sufficient jurisdiction to play a real 
role in the struggle against international crime. There is no danger that the court will be 
trivialized as long as it is making a valuable contribution to criminal justice.132 Hence, the 
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presumption of the ICC’s supporters is that it will be used and expanded as necessary into the 
future. 
While some developing States may look to the ICC to model their criminal code, most 
developed States would resist such a model in favour of their system already in use. It is 
conceivable that reformers would seek to leverage change in their national judicial systems 
through seeking to expand the influence of the ICC into the domestic sphere. An obvious area 
where this would likely occur is capital punishment. If the ICC were to become the model of 
criminal justice, States continuing to impose capital punishment would come under increasing 
pressure to alter their laws to conform to the international standard. Indeed, minority interests 
(including individual defendants with creative defence attorneys) could seek to use the ICC 
standard to overcome majority chosen positions in criminal law. Further argument is made 
that the continued existence of the ‘prosecute or extradite’ notion of international criminal 
obligations has a distinct advantage which may suffer as a result of the establishment of 
international criminal jurisdiction over certain international crimes. ‘Prosecute or extradite’ 
means that international criminal laws are incorporated into the domestic system, thus 
resulting in better integration of those laws into the legal culture of the incorporating national 
legal order. If international crimes are tried before an international tribunal whose decisions 
and judgments have no precedential value in a national court, and whose persuasive value 
may be considerably minimised due to political or other considerations, that incorporation 
effect is lost.
Perhaps the central issue facing the ICC is its effect on sovereignty. Beyond the general threat 
to national sovereignty, the Rome Statute and the ICC directly conflict with many national 
constitutions. The ICC’s supranational jurisdiction cannot be reconciled with the judicial 
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system created by the constitutions of many States. The seemingly vague and ambiguous 
crimes that the ICC would prosecute could not pass constitutional scrutiny in a number of 
countries. And there are no provisions in the Rome Statute for many of the protections 
guaranteed by some Bill of Rights--for example, trial by jury. In many States, the constitution 
is the supreme law of the land with all other laws (whether national or international) being 
subordinate. With countless judicial decisions in domestic courts trumpeting the unbridled 
supremacy of their respective constitutions, it will be interesting to see whether the Rome 
Statute will triumph even where it seemingly contravenes a constitutional provision. While 
arguably a municipal law provision cannot provide justification for failure to observe an 
international obligation, with the United States leading the dissident group, it will not be an 
easy argument to advance. Coupled to constitutional provisions is the fact that judicial power 
in States is vested in its courts which are ordained and established by the national assembly. 
Thus arguably only a court of the State may exercise jurisdiction over a citizen for offences 
committed within the State. Therefore, at a theoretical and significantly a technical level the 
Rome Statute would conflict with State constitutions if the ICC attempted to assert 
jurisdiction over a citizens for offences committed on a particular State’s territory. 
Finally, the ICC fails to address the problem that it identifies. Justice is an attempt to set 
things right, after the crime has been committed. The genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass 
rapes have been committed long before the judicial process can begin. By the time evidence 
has been gathered and suspects apprehended, the value of the judicial remedy begins to 
degrade, particularly when dealing with crimes on a massive scale. Ultimately, life 
incarceration remains unlikely for the chief perpetrators if historical precedent means 
anything.133 The international community appropriately desires the end to crimes against 
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humanity, war crimes, genocide, and aggression. The experience of generations has been that 
punishment, while important, is at best a poor remedy for the victims. The victim’s greatest 
desire is to avoid victimisation in the first place. Therefore, the best solutions to today’s 
humanitarian crises lie not in adjudication that is too late for the traumatised victims, but in 
prevention. Perhaps Carrie Gustafson is right, and justice such as is envisioned by the ICC 
should be abandoned because it only perpetuates violence.134 Perhaps adherence to the tenets 
of the world’s greatest moral and ethical philosophers would provide a better solution to both 
international crime and punishment.135 However, prevention, whatever its form, of war and 
criminal activity may be as difficult to achieve as effective punishment provided for by the 
ICC. 
VI. Conclusion
As a matter of process, the making of the Rome Statute was extraordinary. Not only was the 
Statute voted on by States, thereby erasing any illusions one may have held about the 
continuing relevance of absolute paradigms of sovereignty in modern times, but the law made 
by the Statute extends to the entire world in cases involving referrals by the Security Council 
under Chapter VII. ‘The ICC will directly or indirectly affect all members of the international 
community. When the ICC becomes a reality, Third States will not be immune from the ICC 
irrespective of whether they ratify the Rome Statute. In particular, non-States Parties will not 
be able to block prosecution of their nationals. The effectiveness of the ICC and its impact on 
human rights and humanitarian law enforcement as well as on the existing international 
criminal justice cooperation system will depend on the degree of support it enjoys among the 
Journal of International Law 51. Though the Rome Statute states that all individuals, regardless of position, are 
equally liable to investigation and prosecution, State cooperation will not be equally available depending on the 
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most influential members of the international community.’136 Hopefully, non-participating 
States, whatever their individual status and influence may be forced into a situation where 
they will have to acknowledge the existence of the ICC as an effective and broadly-
represented international criminal judiciary that even non-States Parties have to deal with.
As for the legal rules comprising the Statute’s substance, several features of the Statute 
challenge the Westphalian model, and the unwritten ‘constitution’ of international law 
premised upon it. The Court will exercise jurisdiction over individuals, including Heads of 
States. The three crimes currently defined within its jurisdiction will cover the internal, as 
well as the international, commission of atrocities on a massive scale. Their codification in the 
Rome Statute strains the current conception of international law as consensual and poses a 
challenge to the content and status of customary international law. As argued by Sadat and 
Carden, ‘the prescriptive jurisdiction of the Court rests on a new theory of universal 
international jurisdiction which embodies in it the seeds of a new approach to the repartition 
of competences between national and international legal orders.’137 Further the Assembly of 
States Parties will take decisions by supermajority vote, thus much of the ‘law’ of the ICC, 
like the law of the European Union, will have a supranational character.138
Some see the Court as a monster arguing that: ‘If allowed to stand--and to thrive and grow, as 
its champions intend--this Court will sound the death knell for national sovereignty, and for 
the freedoms associated with limited, constitutional government.’139 But there are those on the 
extreme end who feel that sovereignty is an outmoded concept and should be discarded, 
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dismissing the whole notion of sovereignty as a false idea and  suggesting that for legal 
purposes, we might do well to relegate the term to the shelf of history as a relic from an 
earlier era.140 Overall, the continued relevance of sovereignty should be balanced against 
reality. Though State sovereignty is still a cornerstone of international law it should not be 
seen as the bulwark from which State prerogatives are defended from foreign infringement, 
even when this ‘infringement’ aims to secure the rights on individuals and entities within the 
domestic sphere.141
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